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Explicit barriers to international trade, investment, technology, and financial flows have 
been reduced considerably. As a result, “macro-liberalization” of international economic 
transactions has largely run its course. Now, attention needs to shift from international 
rules for governments to international rules dealing with the various aspects of the 
international operations of firms – what are called “micro-issues” in this chapter; these 
include, by way of example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and international 
bankruptcies. Such international rules for the principal actors in international production 
and markets would complement (or replace) the unilateral rules that exist at the national 
level. International rules would set the direct parameters for certain aspects of the 
international activities of firms and hence provide the global governance for operating in 
the global production and trading spaces. This chapter exemplifies for a number of areas 
the state of rule-making for some micro issues, analyses the nature of this rule-making and 
suggests a way forward. Developing international micro-regulatory frameworks of rules of 
the road for the various aspects of the international operations of firms in the globalizing 
world economy should be the new frontier of international commercial diplomacy. 
 




Explicit barriers to international trade, investment, technology, and financial flows have 
been reduced considerably. As a result, “macro-liberalization” of, and rule-making for, 
international economic transactions have largely run their course. Attention is shifting 
toward behind-the-border issues.
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  But attention also needs to shift from international rules 
for governments to international rules dealing with the various aspects of the international 
operations of firms – what are called “micro-issues” in this chapter, including, by way of 
example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and international bankruptcies. 
Such international rules agreed-upon by governments for the principal actors in 
international production and markets would complement (or replace) the unilateral rules 
that exist at the national level. Such international rules would set the direct parameters for 
certain aspects of the cross-border activities of firms and hence provide the global 
governance for operating in the global production and trading spaces.  Developing 
international micro-regulatory frameworks of rules of the road for the various aspects of 
the international operations of firms in the globalizing world economy should be the new 
frontier of international commercial diplomacy. 
 Few such international micro-regulatory governance frameworks exist today below the 
macro-regulatory framework and for the global space the latter creates.  Instead, firms are 
typically subject to a myriad of unilateral national rules. In the past, this was relatively 
unproblematic, as issues that concerned directly specific aspects of the operations of firms 
could be addressed effectively at the national level.  Today, this situation makes it 
challenging for managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to navigate the regulatory 
frameworks of the countries in which their firms operate. It also creates governance gaps, 
that is, discontinuities between the needs of global markets and an integrated international 
production system and the global value chains that are part of it, on the one hand, and the 
reach of (different) national regulatory frameworks dealing with internationally operating 
firms, on the other.  Thus, for instance, when firms headquartered in one country engage in 
cross-border M&As, go bankrupt, engage in lending, establish closed user-group networks 
(such as airline reservation systems), report on their financial performance, offer insurance 
services, rate the credit worthiness of other firms or governments, produce inferior goods 
that endanger consumers, or engage in transactions with entities in sanctioned countries, 
firms and consumers from many countries, as well as various governments, may well be 
affected.
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 In 2014, the recognition of such a governance gap in one particular area led the 
G-20 to deal as a group with tax avoidance by MNEs.
3
  
 While this chapter suggests that international micro-regulation is necessary, and that 
governments and other players have to attend to this need, more regulation – and that of a 
multilateral kind – is understandably controversial.  The discussion below recognizes that 
sentiment, as shown in the section that sets out the advantages of the current ad hoc 
approach. The objective is to raise an issue -- more through examples than anything else -- 
rather than to offer full-fledged solutions or conclusions.  Indeed, one of the points that 
require attention is precisely the trade-offs relating to the advantages and disadvantages of 
a government-led systematic approach leading to mandatory international instruments, on 
the one hand, and a market-driven ad hoc approach leading to voluntary international 
arrangements, on the other.
4
 In either case, though, the challenge is to adapt to the realities 





MACRO-LIBERALIZATION HAS LARGELY RUN ITS COURSE 
Consider the following developments:  
 Bound tariffs of developed countries on trade in industrial products were reduced by 
about 75 percent between 1967 and 2000,
6
 and they were further reduced in 
 3 
subsequent years on particular products.
 
Disciplines are being put in place to dismantle 
non-tariff barriers.  Trade in services is being progressively liberalized, though mostly 
on a non-committed, that is, reversible, basis. The world trading system has been 
strengthened with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
dispute-settlement mechanism. 
 Financial liberalization has proceeded even faster than the liberalization of trade, 
perhaps too fast for some countries.  A global financial architecture is emerging (even 
if it needs adaptation), overseen by the IMF.  
 Many obstacles to the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been removed, 
with the great majority of policy changes at the national level going in the direction of 
making the investment climate more welcoming for foreign investors (although 
increasingly so in a more nuanced manner). At the same time, standards for the 
protection and treatment of international investors have been strengthened through 
over 3,000 international investment agreements.
7
 In addition, some two-thirds of 
world FDI flows are covered by the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
with the bulk of the rest covered by regional or bilateral agreements (which, although 
typically called "free trade" agreements, are increasingly becoming "free investment" 
agreements as well). 
 The defensive national transfer-of-technology regimes of the 1960s and 1970s have 
given way to a strong multilateral system for the protection of intellectual property 
rights, embodied in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2005). This regime is further expanded by 
regional and bilateral agreements. The international technology market has never been 
more favorable for the owners of intellectual property. 
 To be sure, things are far from perfect, setbacks take place and a number of issues 
remain outstanding.  For example, protectionism remains an ever-present danger, both in 
the trade and international investment areas.
8
 The Eurozone is under strain. Some key 
sectors of particular interest to developing countries (notably agriculture and textiles) are 
still not significantly liberalized.  The movement of labor has barely received attention, 
and a multilateral framework for investment is still lacking.  But, otherwise, the 
outstanding trade issues are either clear cut (e.g., to reduce tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation), or they are shifting more and more toward fairly technical questions of 
implementation (e.g., special and differential treatment for developing countries) or to 
trade-related issues (e.g., environment, competition).  Similarly, managing the formidable 
global financial market, reducing its instability and strengthening the global financial 
architecture remain a challenge.  Tackling these outstanding issues is difficult.  They are 
part of the (unfinished) old agenda, and they need continued attention.  
 Overall, however, the basic rules are largely in place. They constitute an open global 
macro-regulatory framework for international trade in goods and services, financial 
transactions, investment, and the movement of technology between and among countries, 
with the WTO and the IMF at its heart.  This framework is far from perfect, and it has one 
glaring omission: it does not address restrictions to labor mobility to any significant 
degree.
9
  It is also difficult to manage.  It is challenged by bilateral and regional deals.  Its 
coherence is imperfect.  But it is in place and, on the whole, it is fairly robust. 
   
GLOBAL SPACES, GLOBAL ACTORS 
The most important characteristic of the global framework mentioned above is that it 
opens global spaces for firms to pursue their activities internationally. Information, 
communication and transportation technologies have made it possible for firms to operate 
globally in real time. Competition among firms makes it likely that, what is possible, is 
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being exploited by firms, in pursuit of their own international competitiveness and 
profitability. 
 The extent to which this has already happened is reflected in the fact that, between 
1990 and 2014, world exports of goods and services rose from US$ 4 trillion to US$ 23 
trillion; world royalties and licensee fee receipts grew from US$ 29 billion to US$ 310 
billion; and world FDI outflows increased from US$ 241 billion to US$ 1,200 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2015, p. 18). The volume of cross-border capital flows grew to nearly US$ 12 
trillion in 2007, before collapsing (due to the financial crisis that began in 2008) to close to 
US$ 5 trillion in 2012 – still, an enormous amount of funds, testifying to the openness of 
the international financial system (Lund et al., 2013, p. 4). 
 Among firms, MNEs are particularly important actors.  The number of MNEs 
headquartered in 15 OECD countries rose from 7,300 at the end of the 1960s (with some 
27,000 foreign affiliates) (United Nations, 1973, pp. 135, 147)
 
to, world-wide, 65,000 
around the turn of the century (with around 850,000 foreign affiliates) (UNCTAD, 2002, 
p. 270) to, again worldwide, at least 100,000 at the end of 2010, controlling a minimum 
number of 900,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 2012, web table 34). (The actual number 
of MNEs and their foreign affiliates is likely to be considerably higher, as their coverage 
across countries is very uneven.) Moreover, the universe of international investors is 
diversifying, as private equity firms, hedge funds, more state-owned enterprises, sovereign 
wealth funds, and born-global entrepreneurial firms engage in international production. 
Moreover, firms from developing countries and economies in transition are also 
increasingly becoming multinational,
10
 with FDI outflows in 2014 from these countries 
(US$530 billion) being roughly eleven times higher than world FDI flows during the first 
half of the 1980s. Especially in developed countries, the expansion of MNEs takes place 
mainly through M&As,
11
 fuelling a global market for firms. 
 Given the largely open macro-framework, MNEs consider the world as one production 
space. Accordingly, they organize their production internationally by locating their 
affiliates wherever in the world particular parts of the value chain (be it in goods or 
services) can be produced best from their point of view, creating an international intra-firm 
division of labor.
12
 Moreover, firms that are not tied to particular parent firms through 
ownership arrangements are increasingly becoming part of these production networks 
through non-equity arrangements. International intra-firm trade, technology and 
knowledge flows tie the various units of individual corporate networks together, which 
remain under the common governance of their headquarters.
13
 While parent firms remain 
the ultimate decision-makers, the role of headquarters increasingly becomes that of 
deciding where various production activities take place, organizing highly complex 
networks, providing key tangible and intangible assets (e.g., finance, brand names, 
research and development), and orchestrating information and knowledge flows within the 
networks.
14
 The results are corporate integrated international production systems 
(UNCTAD, 1993) and the global value chains that define them (UNCTAD, 2013).
15
 In 
aggregation, these add up to the expanding integrated international production system that 
is the productive core of the globalizing world economy.  
 This process is reflected in the fact that roughly one-third of world trade consists of 
intra-firm trade, and an even higher percentage is associated with global value chains 
(UNCTAD, 2013), internalizing in this manner certain types of international transactions. 
International production – production by foreign affiliates (US$36 trillion, compared with 
world exports of US$23 trillion, both in 2014; UNCTAD, 2015, p. 18) – has become more 
important than exports in delivering goods and services to foreign markets. The combined 
domestic and foreign output of MNEs suggest that as much as one-quarter of world output 
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– if not more -- is under the common governance of MNEs, with a percentage that is 
considerably higher in a number of industries (UNCTAD, 1999).  
 In sum, technological innovations in communications and transportation have 
combined with government policies to shrink the distances that once separated the 
economies of this world. Competition among firms has ensured that the new opportunities 
are being utilized, as reflected in the expansion of international economic transactions 
undertaken by them.  The production and market spaces in which many firms operate are 
no longer national.  Rather, an integrated international production system, centred on 
developed countries but becoming wider, is emerging, complementing the global markets 
for goods, services, intellectual property, and capital, and driven by global actors. 
 
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL MICRO-REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
With an open macro-framework largely in place, the spotlight falls on firms, the principal 
actors in the international production process and in international markets.  They – whether 
large or small, from developed or developing countries – drive the globalization process 
through trade, finance, technology transfer, and foreign direct investment. 
 To deal with firms at the international level, however, requires a paradigm shift in 
international commercial policy making: rules should no longer only govern the action of 
governments at the national level but also the operations of firms at the international 
level.
16
  With more and more firms operating globally and in an integrated manner, more 
and more corporate issues acquire an international dimension as well.  Even firms in big 
countries, be they developed or developing, are virtually compelled to orient their 
activities beyond their domestic markets.
17
  They have become (or are becoming) part of 
the world economy – via exports and imports, inward and outward investment, alliances, 
licensing and franchising arrangements, and other business transactions. Rules need to 
adapt to the reality of the globalizing and integrating world economy: national regulation 
alone of the operations of firms is no longer sufficient, in fact, effective, in a globalizing 
world economy. Stable, predictable and transparent global governance rules dealing with 
the operations of firms are needed. 
 To put it differently, the logic of the globalization process and, in particular, the 
emergence of an integrated international production system and the global value chains 
that are part and parcel of it, require that the national rules governing corporate operations 
most affected by the globalization and integration process be complemented, if not 
supplanted, by global micro-regulatory frameworks.  It is a process that involves the 
internationalization of some aspects of the domestic policy agenda relating to firms (Ostry, 
1992).  Only when an open macro-framework is complemented by appropriate micro-
frameworks governing the various types of operations of firms – animal spirits aside – can 
firms prosper, and public and private interests be properly balanced.
18
  The creation of 
such frameworks requires deliberate attention and action. 
 The nature of such frameworks for the various types of operations of firms, the 
contents of its rules, and how the frameworks and rules are formulated and enforced (and 
hence which interests they reflect), are of critical importance for all firms, as they 
influence who benefits from the way in which corporate activities are carried out.  This is 
true for firms from both developing and developed countries:  in a world in which 
production systems and markets are global and profit preserves are disappearing under the 
onslaught of liberalized trade, technology, investment, and financial flows, competition is 
everywhere.  There is a particular need to see to it that firms in developing countries are 
not disadvantaged in this competition, as competitive firms are the bedrock of growth and 
development.  Micro-rules set the parameters for the international competitiveness of firms 
and hence influence the extent to which the development prospects of the countries in 
 6 
which they are located can be advanced. It is a challenge to make sure that firms based in 
developing countries are not disadvantaged, as most of the governments of these countries, 
as well as the business associations in these countries, typically have only limited capacity 
to deal with such matters. 
 The establishment of micro-rules for the operations of firms in the globalizing and 
integrating world economy should be the new frontier for international commercial 
diplomacy.  It is in fact the rise of an integrated international production system and the 
global value chains that are part and parcel of it that render this challenge more urgent than 
before. The question therefore arises:  how are these rules to be created and by whom? 
Indeed, governments have begun to recognize the importance of, and need for, micro-rules 
in the context of bilateral and regional trade agreements.
19
 However, in the absence of a 
multilateral dialogue on these issues, this risks creating mutually inconsistent regulatory 
regimes, partly overlapping, which, in turn, would impose high administrative burdens on 
MNEs and could distort their locational decisions and it would not necessarily reflect an 
appropriate balance between public and private interests. 
 
CURRENT MICRO-REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
So far, little systematic attention has been given to the issues that global micro-regulatory 
frameworks need to address, the substantive content of such frameworks and the 
modalities of creating them.
20
  Rather, to the extent that global micro-rules have emerged, 
they have typically done so reactively (e.g., in reaction to specific problems as they arise), 
and they have often been created by a limited number of business actors, typically from 
developed countries.  This haphazard, market-driven process is in danger of not taking the 
interests of other actors – especially firms from developing countries and various 
stakeholders – fully into account. 
What is the nature of current micro-regulatory frameworks?  Consider the following 
examples: 
  Mergers and acquisitions.  If two large MNEs merge, the competition authorities in 
the countries in which the two have affiliates (not to count the countries that may be 
affected by such transactions via trade) may need to authorize the transaction for it to 
go ahead since, frequently, antitrust issues have to be considered.
21
 (Table 1 gives an 
indication of the minimum number of countries that would be affected if one of the 
large financial MNEs should be acquired by, or merged with, another large financial 
firm.)  Each country has its own review processes, procedures, criteria, priorities, and 
time-frames for M&As.  This can cause delays, uncertainty, costs and, in some cases, 
the abandonment of a merger plan.
22
  Moreover, smaller countries (and especially 
developing countries) typically do not have the resources and expertise to examine the 
effects that large-scale M&As of this sort may have on them.  
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Table 1. The international presence of large financial MNEs, majority-owned foreign 
affiliates, 2012 
 
Source:  UNCTAD, 2013. 
If anything, this issue is becoming more urgent, as reflected in the growth of 
international M&As: the value of cross-border M&As rose from US$ 100 billion 
in 1990 to a peak of US$ 1 trillion in 2000, fluctuating thereafter between US$ 
167 billion and US$ 1 trillion until 2014.
23
  The number of such deals rose from 
862 in 1987 to 7,800 in 2000 (UNCTAD 2000, p. 232, UNCTAD 2002, pp. 11), to 
reach 8,624 in 2013.
24
   
 
An international market for firms needs international rules for cross-border 
M&As.  In the absence of such rules, enforcement remains a domestic 
responsibility and inter-governmental cooperation is ad hoc, pretty much 
restricted to the U.S. and European Union competition authorities.
25
 This is even 
more a challenge as the number of competition authorities has risen considerably 
in recent years (see Figure 1). While this is a positive development, it multiplies 
complexities and creates uncertainties for firms. 
 
 
Figure 1. More competition authorities dealing with more cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, 1995-2013 
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Source: OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law 
Enforcement (Paris: OECD, 2014), available at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/challenges-
international-coop-competition-2014.htm, pp. 24, 27. 
  Bankruptcy.  If a large MNE goes bankrupt today, not only its home country but also 
the many host countries in which it has affiliates are directly affected (Table 1).  A 
high-profile early example was the 1991 collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), which at that time operated 380 offices in nearly 70 countries – 
the largest international banking failure at that time. Another example was the demise 
of Polly Peck International, a smaller United Kingdom-based conglomerate; 
differences between legal systems and insolvency laws held up the settlement of this 
case for several years.
26
 More recently, the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to a 
bankruptcy that spanned nine jurisdictions. This time, however, interested parties 
organized the proceedings under a private protocol, allowing jurisdictions to intervene 
in each other’s proceedings.  
 
However, most global bankruptcies still operate on a territorial basis, with 
separate filings in each different country (Altman, 2011, pp. 469-470). In the 
absence of an international approach to bankruptcies, each country seeks to "ring-
fence" the assets located on its territory, with little regard to the possible rescue of 
the enterprise as a whole: this is a problem because, to the extent that individual 
foreign affiliates are fully integrated into their corporate networks, they are 
typically not viable on their own, so that, in the end, both the host and home 
countries involved are negatively affected.  With more than 100,000 MNEs (a 
number that is increasing), more and more of them having a rising number of 
affiliates in a growing number of countries, and more and more being fully 
integrated into the international production networks of their parent firms, more 
and more complicated bankruptcy cases are likely to occur.  No international rules 
for corporate bankruptcies exist, although the United Nations Commission on 




 Minimum capital reserve requirements for banks, as part of the regulation of financial 
institutions.  The financial sector is one of the most important sectors in any economy, 
and it is generally very internationalized. Minimum capital reserve requirements for 
banks are key to the stability of this sector; national banking supervision authorities set 
those requirements. Work on harmonized standards for banking supervision has been 
on the agenda of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for some time. More 
specifically, the Committee’s mandate is “to strengthen the regulation, supervision and 
practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.”28 The 
Committee’s decisions do not have legal force, but, de facto, represent governance in 
this particular area of activity. Rather, the Committee “expects full implementation of 
its standards” by its members (representing 27 jurisdictions 29 ) “and their 
internationally active banks.”30 In practice, many non-members adopt the Committee’s 
rules as well, owing to the lack of widely accepted alternatives and the standing of the 
Committee’s rules in international financial markets for institutions that depend on 
such markets. For example, by July 2014, all Committee members had implemented, 
or were in the process of implementing, Basel III (a comprehensive set of reform 





   Airline computer reservation systems (CRSs). Airline CRSs gather all flight-related 
information on single platforms. Being listed on such a platform, and the precise place 
where the listing appears (especially on the first screen), can be crucial for airlines to 
attract customers. Travel agents use CRSs regularly to find flights corresponding to 
their clients’ demands, and individuals increasingly do the same. During the mid-
1970s, a few major airlines first developed CRSs that were used by the majority of 
airlines and travel agents. The CRS-developing airlines were soon accused of using 
CRSs to privilege their own flights. In the 1980s, national and regional authorities 
started regulating the use of CRSs, for antitrust purposes. In 1984 and 1992, for 
example, the U.S. Department of Transportation adopted CRS regulations prohibiting 
display bias and forcing airlines that used one CRS to list their flights on other CRSs 
as well (Caliskan and Cochran, 2003, pp. 1-3).
32
 The European Community took 
similar steps in 1989
33
 (Milde, 2008, p. 115). On the whole, CRSs and air traffic 
worldwide came to be regulated by a web of bilateral treaties in the absence of 
multilateral solutions
34
 (Abeyratne, 2005-2006, p. 39). To complicate matters further, 
United States and European Union competition laws often provided for their 
application beyond their own borders  (as shown by the U.S. regulation of CRSs), 
leading to conflicts of laws (Abeyratne, 2005-2006, p. 61). In 1986, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established itself as the main body within the 
United Nations to regulate international air transport (Abeyratne, 2005-2006, p. 47). 
The ICAO issues model codes and non-binding guidelines
35
 to harmonize airline 
competition laws throughout the world (Abeyratne, 2005-2006, p. 43). 
  Accounting and reporting standards. At present, MNEs in developed countries keep 
at least two sets of accounts: consolidated (group) accounts
36
 according to the 
reporting requirements of their home countries, and accounts of individual foreign 
affiliates according to national accounting standards of the countries in which each 
affiliate is registered.  Group accounts in most cases are prepared in accordance with 
one of two major accounting systems:  the International Financial Reporting Standards 
developed by the International Accounting Standards Board,
37
 or the U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, established by the U.S. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board.
38
 Firms from developing countries and from economies in transition 
in most cases have to use one of the two systems or variations of them for the purpose 
of helping them obtain access to international capital markets.  Many economies in 
transition and a number of developing countries are in the process of reforming their 
national accounting systems by either adopting the International Financial Reporting 
Standards in full, or developing new national regulations on the basis of this standard. 
As of April 8, 2015, 114 jurisdictions required the application of International 
Financial Reporting Standards for most or all domestically listed companies, while 
128 (out of 138) jurisdictions had publicly committed to the convergence of 
accounting standards.
39
 When weaknesses in the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles were revealed by the collapse of Enron and by subsequent corporate 
scandals, the U.S. Congress approved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 to improve 
corporate governance (Box).  This legislation applies to all companies listed on United 
States stock exchanges, regardless of whether they are headquartered in the United 
States or not;
40
 it also applies to foreign affiliates of U.S. MNEs. 
  
Today, the International Financial Reporting Standards are the world’s most widely 
adopted standards. The International Accounting Standards Board and the U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board have engaged in efforts to bring about a 
convergence of the two accounting standards, and both are now quite similar. The 
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U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board, however, has not agreed to adopt the 




Box.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  a study in global standard setting by one country. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a case study of a reactive approach to rule-making. 
It is also a case study of how, under the pressure of time to respond to an acute 
crisis, rule-making may not always be undertaken carefully; what technical 
micro-rules are like; and how in the absence of an international approach, 
action by one government can have implications for other governments and 
their regulatory regimes. 
 
When Enron went bankrupt on December 2, 2001, Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
Congressperson Michael Oxley introduced, on January 23, 2002, corporate 
reform legislation that gained momentum as additional scandals broke. It was 
approved by both Houses of the U.S. Congress in July 2002, and signed into 
law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002.  According to the CPA 
Letter,
a/
 it is "the most significant legislation affecting the accounting 
profession since 1933."  The Financial Times added:
b/
  "most of those affected 
now admit that it was hastily drawn up." 
 
While the Act deals with corporate reform in the United States, its implications 
reach beyond that country as it applies to all companies listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges as well as to the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms.  At the same time, a 
number of its provisions were in conflict with approaches taken outside the 
United States.  For example, the Act required that all members of a company's 
audit committee be independent; this conflicted with the German law that all 
firms with more than 2,000 employees fill half of their supervisory board seats 
with elected work-force representatives, with some of them also being 
members of the audit committee.  Another example was the requirement that 
the chief executive and financial officers needed to certify their firms’ financial 
statements and, hence, become personally responsible for misstatements; in 
Germany, on the other hand, these matters were the collective responsibilities 
of the management board.  The Act (Sec. 106) also allowed U.S. authorities to 
raid the offices of European accounting firms in case of controversy between 
such firms and the U.S. Public Oversight Board. In fact, virtually all non-U.S. 
firms are subject to the Board’s inspections. While most jurisdictions do not 
object, a few jurisdictions (like China and Hong Kong (China)) are reluctant to 
grant access to the Board. In many cases, the Board conducts investigations in 
collaboration with national oversight authorities.
c/
 The implication is that firms 
can either de-list themselves from U.S. stock markets, thereby losing direct 
access to the world's most important capital market, or they can seek 
exemptions from certain provisions (which, for example, the European 
Commission was doing); the granting of exemptions might reflect, of course, 
the importance of the requestors and the strength of their own corporate 
governance standards.  Companies could, of course, comply by changing their 
own practices if their national laws permit it. 
 
In sum (to quote the CPA Letter again
d/
):  "High-profile business failures . . . 
called into question the effectiveness of the profession's self-regulatory process 
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. . . ." The resulting legislative remedy, in the words of a commercial law expert 






    Vol. 82, September 2002, p. 1. 
b/ 
   December 30, 2002, p. 9.  The newspaper quoted Oxley as saying that the bill was 
"passed in almost a panic sort of situation" (ibid.). 
c/
 “Non-US firms inspections,” PCAOB’s website, available at 
http://pcaobus.org/International/Inspections/Pages/default.aspx, last visited April 8, 
2014. 
d/
   Vol. 82, September 2002, p. 1. 
e/
    Financial Times, December 30, 2002, p. 9. 
 
  Insurance regulation.  Insurance, too, is a sector of critical importance to any 
economy. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors was established in 
1994, with a permanent secretariat in Basel.
42
  Representing insurance regulators and 
supervisors in nearly 140 countries, the Association agrees on "core principles" for the 
supervision of insurance operations, and all its members adopt these.  The IMF uses its 
guidelines and standards when vetting the reinsurance frameworks of developing 
countries.  The Association's "Emerging Markets Committee" deals with issues of 
special concern to developing countries.  
  Credit rating. Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch (all three headquartered in New 
York) dominate the market for the credit rating of companies and governments.  When 
any of them reduces the credit-worthiness of a government or a company, there can be 
immediate implications for its access to capital markets and especially the costs at 
which it can borrow money.  In a sense, this makes these three firms quasi-official 
regulators of public and private debt markets. 
  Business-to-consumer commerce. Cross-border commerce has long been largely 
limited to business-to-business transactions, regulated by international uniform 
substantive law such as the International Convention on the Sales of Goods.
43
 
Recently, however, the use of the Internet has led to unprecedented cross-border 
transactions directly between businesses and consumers. These transactions, however, 
are yet to be regulated by uniform international rules. As of 2014, online dispute 
resolution generally was the only way to resolve cross-border business-to-consumer 
disputes (Johnson, 2013, p. 582). Various attempts to apply national laws have 
failed.
44
 Treaty negotiations between the United States and European Union 
authorities have also proved unfruitful so far.
45
 This results in considerable legal 
uncertainty likely to deter both consumers and businesses from engaging in cross-
border transactions. It also reduces consumers’ influence on the legal landscape of 
consumer protection. Consumer groups advocate legislative change in their respective 
countries, only to see national law supplanted by ad hoc cross-border dispute 
resolution processes that rely on fair principles of international law (Stewart and 
Matthews, 2002, p. 1136). 
  Corporate transactions with countries on which sanctions have been imposed. As the 
2014 example of BNP Paribas’s $8.9 billion settlement46 illustrates, corporate entities 
often must comply with foreign sanctions laws; in this case, BNP pleaded guilty to 
having processed billions of dollars of transactions through the U.S. financial system 
on behalf of Cuban, Iranian and Sudanese entities subject to U.S. economic sanctions 
(Zagaris, 2014). Some U.S. sanctions laws, for example, apply to foreign-owned 
subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies, foreign companies re-exporting U.S. goods to 
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sanctioned entities and foreign companies conducting transactions through the United 
States’ financial system (Rathbone et al., 2013, pp. 1107-1119). This extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law has resulted in conflicts of laws. For instance, foreign 
companies were threatened with U.S. sanctions for selling Cuban products or 
providing services to Cuban officials; on the other hand, national laws prohibited them 
from discriminating against Cuban products or officials.
47
 More generally, foreign 
sanctions laws expose MNEs to compliance obligations arising from foreign 
jurisdictions that can conflict with the laws of their home jurisdictions. In many cases, 
conflicts of laws have been avoided thanks to international consensus on sanctions: for 
example, after the U.S. Congress passed a new sanctions law prohibiting foreign 
financial and oil companies from certain transactions with Iran, the European Union 
enacted similar provisions so as to manifest its agreement with the sanctions and 
eliminate conflict-of-law issues (Rathbone et al., 2013, pp. 1122-1123). However, 
unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial application remain to be harmonized in a 
systematic way, which would arguably prompt issues of political governance.
48
 
 As these examples illustrate, the regulation of global corporate operations -- its 
governance -- can take various forms and have different strength (mandatory, voluntary). It 
also has many sources (ranging from strictly national to international approaches), 
originates from the private sector or individual governments, and it can be entirely absent. 
For example:  
 Absence of global rules. Such is the case, for example, in matters of bankruptcy, 
business-to-consumer transactions and transactions with politically sanctioned entities. 
In bankruptcy matters, the case of Lehman Brothers shows that national legal systems 
are still entirely independent in this particular area. When an MNE faces bankruptcy in 
multiple jurisdictions, it has no international rules to fall back on in order to 
restructure itself and become viable again. In the absence of global rules, voluntary 
and ad hoc cooperation among jurisdictions has been the only approach to deal with 
such situations. 
 Corporate actions with a global governance impact. Some corporate pronouncements 
have such an impact throughout the world that they amount to sector-specific 
“governance”. In the credit-rating area, for example, private companies based in the 
United States (such as Moody’s, Standards & Poor’s, Fitch) can impact companies and 
governments’ borrowing abilities, whether in the United States or elsewhere. They 
have assumed a sort of de facto international quasi-regulatory role (but are themselves 
not regulated by anyone). They are actors that have emerged to fill a need. 
 Mandatory national regulations that, de facto, become international regulations. For 
example, the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a national regulation with an 
international impact: it became, de facto, an international regulation as it applied to all 
companies—even foreign ones—registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as well as to the foreign affiliates of U.S. MNEs. Similarly, the 
regulation of airline computer reservation systems by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation not only protected every airline to a certain extent (regardless of 
nationality) from display bias, but also prohibited
49
 them from using such bias in their 
own computer reservation systems. Finally, U.S. sanctions laws apply not only to U.S. 
companies, but also to foreign-owned subsidiaries of U.S. companies and foreign 
companies that use the United States’ financial system or re-export U.S. goods. 
 Model arrangements that can serve as templates for the cooperation of 
countries in specific areas. The above-mentioned UNCITRAL bankruptcy 
Model Law is an example. The Model Law does not aim at unifying different 
national laws, but provides cooperation provisions for incorporation in existing 
 13 
laws. National laws based on the Model Law empower courts of different 
countries to communicate and cooperate in making decisions. For instance, 
national laws based on the Model Law would facilitate the recognition of 
orders issued by foreign courts. It also gives foreign creditors and court 
officials a right of access to the courts of an enacting state. By early-2015, 21 
countries had adopted legislation based on UNCITRAL’s Model Law. 50  In 
particular, the U.S. Congress updated the country’s Bankruptcy code in 2005 
with a new chapter (Chapter 15) providing a window for cooperation with 
foreign courts and foreign parties.
51
 Chapter 15 is now used in bankruptcies of 
multinational entities. In 2009, for example, the Southern District of New York 
agreed to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings regarding a Switzerland-
incorporated subsidiary of Lehman Brothers (U.S. G.A.O., 2011).  
 International private regulation. In matters of accounting and insurance, the 
International Accounting Standards Board and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors harmonize corporate practices on a global basis. Neither of the 
two are governmental bodies. Rather, they are both not-for-profit organizations, with 
ties to national supervisory and regulatory entities. The International Accounting and 
Standards Board is accountable to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
Foundation, which is accountable (through its Board of Trustees) to the Monitoring 
Board, a “body of publically accountable market authorities” (among which are the 
SEC and the European Commission).
52
 The International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors relies on voluntary membership of supervisors and regulators (public and 
private) from nearly 140 countries. It counts the European Commission and the U.S. 
Federal Insurance Office among its members.
53
 
 International government regulation. In some areas, the international regulation of 
certain activities involves virtually all countries. An example is the International 
Labour Organization under which agreements are forged whose main aims are “to 
promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social 
protection and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.” 54   But there are also 
certain activities for which a limited number of public authorities make de facto rules 
accepted by many (if not most) countries. In the financial area, the Basel Committee 
brings together 27 jurisdictions, but its decisions are accepted by more than 100 
jurisdictions. However, decisions are largely made by the G-10 developed countries, 
although the Committee expanded in 2009 to include such emerging markets as Brazil, 
China, India, and Russia. Still, developing countries in general seem to have little 
influence on the Committee’s rulemaking.55 While the Committee’s regulations are 
voluntary (i.e., have no legal force), they reach virtually all internationally active 
banks.  
Overall, what characterizes most of the micro-regulatory efforts undertaken so far is that: 
 They are partial in the sense that they address only some areas relevant to the range of 
corporate operations. Presumably, these are areas that, at a certain point, were 
particularly pressing in a globalizing environment and/or had drivers behind them that 
were strong enough to promote international approaches. 
 They are sometimes geographically quite restricted. In fact, it may be only one 
country, or a small group of countries, that makes rules that become de facto global 
standards. 
 They are elaborated by a variety of entities, sometimes in combination with each 
other:  sometimes by governments (or specific governmental institutions), sometimes 
by the legislative authorities of a few or even of a single country, sometimes by the 
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business community, sometimes by professional associations, and sometimes by one 
or a few dominant companies.
56
 
 Governments, business associations or firms from developing countries are often not 
involved in the rule-making although the rules may apply de facto equally to all firms 
wishing to participate in the integrated international production system or the global 
trading system.  Even when the bodies involved pay attention to developing countries, 
development issues are not vital to them. 
 There is also the question of global rules concerning the responsibilities of market 
actors, and especially MNEs. An early effort to formulate a set of such rules was made in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, when the United Nations sought to negotiate a comprehensive 
set of rules dealing, among other things, with the responsibilities of MNEs, an effort that 
came to naught (Sauvant, 2015). However, such rules, albeit voluntary ones, were adopted 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
57
 and they 
exist in a number of sectors
58
 (most recently related to human rights
59
). This issue remains 
on the international agenda, including in the context of improving the international 
investment law and policy regime, and, sooner or later, is likely to be addressed. 
 As this discussion indicates, there are many efforts to build international micro-
regulatory frameworks, involving a wide range of private and public institutions. It is a 
patchwork of efforts, with uneven geographical coverage and a variety of drivers, and it 
does not cover important operations of firms in a satisfactory manner.  In a by-and-large 
reactive market-driven process, global production and market rules tend to evolve ad hoc 
to satisfy primarily the operational requirements of firms from developed countries, and 
they are voluntary. They are often informed by and/or agreed upon in "webs of influence" 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) by a relatively small group of large firms from developed 
countries (or semi-private professional associations, typically dominated by 
representatives from developed countries).  At times, they have acquired official status, 
especially through action by the competent regulatory agencies of developed countries. 
Governments too may take the initiative and introduce mandatory rules. Rules are often 
updated in light of the experiences of the principal firms affected by them and of the 
changing conditions in (primarily) developed countries.  Most countries, and especially 
developing countries, tend to be rule-takers, not rule-makers. The conditions and interests 
of firms from these countries are therefore not a prime concern influencing the setting, 
implementation and revision of the rules.  As a result, firms from countries for which these 
rules may not be adequate may be at a disadvantage. They may even constitute barriers to 
their participation in the integrated international production system and global markets.  
Yet, the emerging micro-regulatory frameworks increasingly determine the competitive 





THE NEW AGENDA 
Is this reactive process of global rule-making satisfactory and sustainable, or even 
desirable? In particular, is it satisfactory and sustainable in a globalizing world economy: 
 That crises are needed, or that a situation becomes obviously unacceptable,61 to set a 
rule-making process in motion? 
 That issues that need an international approach continue to be left to a few (often 
competing) national jurisdictions, with a potential for inefficiencies and even conflict? 
 That the global operations of firms might be disrupted because of some rules’ limited 
geographical application? Or, alternatively, that certain geographical areas are left out 
from the rule-making or are rule-takers with little influence on the emerging global 
micro-regulatory frameworks? 
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 That one group of governments (or individual parts of one or several governments) 
can make rules for the rest of the world? 
 That global rules are defined, at least de facto, by parts of the business community or 
individual firms, reflecting private (but not necessarily public) interests (including the 
possibility of hidden protectionism)?  
 That, in each case, perhaps only the (limited) interest of the rule-makers determine the 
content of the rules?  
 These questions are particularly relevant considering that the multinationalization of 
firms is most likely to continue unabated and, with it, the expansion of the integrated 
international production system. This is not only reflected in the figures mentioned earlier 
regarding the growth of the number of firms that have become MNEs and the rise of FDI 
flows. It is also reflected in the extent to which firms that are already MNEs have become 
more multinational: thus, the degree of multinationalization of the world’s 100 largest non-
financial MNEs,
62
 as measured by a composite transnationality index that captures the 
proportion of foreign assets, employment and sales in their respective totals, grew from 47 
in 1993 (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 15) to 56 in 2003 (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 15) and to 67 in 2013 
(UNCTAD, 2014, web Table 28). While the foreign assets of the top 100 MNEs amounted 
to US$1.3 trillion in 1993 (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 7), they had risen to US$ 4 trillion in 2003 
(UNCTAD, 2005, Table I.4, p. 17), and to US$ 8 trillion in 2013, accounting that year for 
59 percent of the firms’ total assets.63 What is important to note in this context is also that 
firms from emerging markets
64
 have become important players in the world FDI market: 
of the 100,000 plus MNEs, some 30,000 are headquartered in emerging markets 
(UNCTAD, 2012, web Table 34). 
There are, of course, strong arguments in favor of the current process of global micro-rule-
making: 
 Rules are established only if and when there is a clearly defined need, often in 
response to specific occurrences or in response to a series of crises.  Hence, the partial 
nature of the emerging frameworks reflects real priorities.  To put it differently:  if the 
need for international rules in a particular subject area is strong enough, rules will 
emerge, and they will be implemented and adapted.  It is essentially a market- and 
demand-driven process based on trial and error, involving also a certain amount of 
regulatory competition. Moreover, the making of rules on a particular issue can begin 
at the national level and then be expanded to a region (including through mutual 
recognition and open codes) and eventually be multilateralized. This, for example, 
happened in the area of corruption.
65
 
 The same arguments apply to the uneven geographical coverage of rules.  There may 
be no urgent need to cover all countries if they play only a marginal role in a given 
area or if some countries want to pursue different approaches. In any event, consensus 
on truly multilateral rules is difficult to obtain in a world of some 200 jurisdictions. 
 In line with the argument that rules ought to be established only if and when they are 
clearly needed, rules should also only be established by those who need them most 
(with others free to join in).  This is also in line with the subsidiarity principle (i.e., 
decisions should be made at the most local level practicable).  It moreover ensures that 
rules are adopted relatively quickly when needed (as contrasted with the typically 
cumbersome multilateral process), and they can be adapted relatively quickly.  (The 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations took some eight years to complete; 
during that time, computer chips roughly doubled their capacity every 18 months, and 
the Internet was born. WTO’s Doha Round, launched in 2001, was still ongoing in 
2015.) 
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 And, of course, the current process of rule-making reflects the reality of power, as 
rules are often also a tool for exercising power and obtaining advantages. To put it 
differently, why should the countries and governments that benefit most from the 
current approach agree to a different approach? To give an example, why would the 
United States agree to restrict the global influence of “its” rating agencies in favor of a 
multilateral approach? Or, if, say, the accounting standards of one country or one 
group of countries become the global rules, the accounting firms grounded in the 
respective rules obtain a competitive advantage. 
 These considerations are important.  They reflect the reality – and rationale -- of the 
global micro-regulatory frameworks that are actually emerging. These frameworks react to 
perceived needs, are market-driven and are largely voluntary in nature. And they reflect 
the reality that economic and business globalization has out-paced the political and social 
organization of states and societies. 
 However, there is an alternative approach – a more systematic one that deliberately 
seeks to identify emerging needs and addresses them before major costs have been 
incurred.  (Braithwaite and Drahos capture the two approaches, in their ideal form, 
instructively in Figure 2, under the headings "top-down" and "bottom up".)   It is a 
systematic, government-driven, regulatory approach, an approach that was pursued when 
the international trade regime was created.
66
 After all, it should not be necessary for a 
series of spectacular corporate governance failures to occur before corrective actions are 
taken – perhaps in the heat of the moment, but with world-wide implications.  Similarly, it 
should not be necessary, for example, for a series of spectacular bankruptcies of large 
MNEs to take place before a multilateral approach to this issue is agreed upon.  In the 
context of growing interdependence, the costs of any crisis or major event are increasingly 
no longer confined to the countries engulfed in a particular crisis or in which a major event 
has taken place; rather, the costs are likely to spread to others, with, at times, potentially 
systemic implications. 
 A more systematic process can move at deliberate speed and explicitly encompass both 
the public and private sectors (and, for that matter, other stakeholders that are affected by a 
particular issues) in order to ensure that a proper balance between public and private 
interests is found.  This consideration also suggests the desirability of broad participation 
by representatives of governments and businesses (and other groups) from developed and 
developing countries.  Such a process would furthermore enhance the legitimacy of the 
rules being established and hence contribute to their overall acceptance – and the 
legitimacy of any framework depends, in the long run, on its capacity to reflect broad 
acceptance by those that are affected by it.
67
 
 A good part of the emerging micro-regulatory frameworks is indeed open to criticism 
when it comes to the question of who formulated the rules and what is the proper balance 
of public vs. private interest. This, in turn, is likely to raise, sooner or later, questions about 
their legitimacy – a challenge that can only intensify as the importance of micro-rules, 
their nature, their contents, and the costs of their absence become more apparent, and the 
weight of countries that were not involved in their formulation increases.  This is not the 
fault of those engaged in the construction of the micro-regulatory frameworks so far:  
typically, they are the ones who have felt the most pressing need and have responded to it 
to the best of their ability.  Besides, what has been achieved in this manner is noteworthy 
and important, and it facilitates the functioning of global markets and the integrated 
international production system.  It is the natural response to the emergence of something 
new, the shape, magnitude and characteristics of which are still vague and evolving, and 
which takes place at a time when governments still focus on macro-liberalization. 
 
 17 















Figure 2. Top-down and bottom-up globalization of regulation. 
Source:  Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 554.  
 However, by now the reality of an integrated international production system and 
global markets is upon us, and more attention needs to be given to the micro-regulatory 
infrastructure of the globalizing world economy.  The logic of globalization suggests that 
governments now need to give more attention to a systematic process of identifying and 
addressing new needs, as opposed to dealing with such needs only after they have 
manifested themselves (repeatedly, and negatively).  This would amount to an extension of 
the systematic process that, over the past 60 years, has characterized macro-rule making, to 
the micro-issues.  The issue is not to replace macro with micro rule-making; rather the 
issue is to shift the balance more to the latter.  In the end, the key challenges are efficiency, 




HOW TO SET THE NEW AGENDA? 
With micro-regulatory issues coming to the forefront, the nature of the current process of 
global micro-rule-making needs to be reviewed, at least as far as three dimensions are 
concerned: 
 What are the micro-issues that require international attention?  Which among them are 
particularly urgent? Which have interested constituencies that could move an issue 
forward? Which issues are most likely to be ripe for consensus, at least about basic 
principles? And, from a development perspective, which are particularly important for 
developing countries and their firms?  Equally important, there are such questions as: 
how does trade and investment deregulation mesh with increasing micro regulation? 
When are global rules important? When do voluntary arrangements work? When do 
they fail and why? How do we determine which global rules have persisted and which 
have languished? When are global rules impossible to enforce, because of the lack of 
global enforcement mechanisms? Do global rules have to be accepted within nation 
states to become effective, implying that the last word remains with individual 
governments? What is the best way to involve various stakeholder groups? The 
establishment of such a list of issues and questions is, in many ways a very technical 
task. It would involve a systematic examination of a broad range of issues that, due to 
the emergence of global markets and an integrated international production system, are 
increasingly difficult to address effectively in a purely domestic context.  Some of 
these issues may well overlap and/or may interact and/or may involve a sequencing in 
terms of action that needs to be taken. It would be a stock-taking exercise which, at a 
Definition of a problem Definition of a problem 
States reach agreement on 
principles for solving the problem 
 
Some business changes practice 
to solve the problem 
Agreement on rules Others model the new practice 
Enforcement of rules Globalization of a new standard of practice 
Globalization of a new standard 
of business practice 
Rules come into line with 
global practice 
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minimum, could serve as an early warning system to draw attention to issues that 
require an international approach.
69
   
 How should priority issues be addressed in terms of form and content? Presumably, 
when the priority issues requiring an international approach are identified, the grounds 
for priorities would be explained as well.  It would also be logical to suggest, at the 
same time, options for how these issues should be addressed internationally, including 
how any rules could be implemented and enforced.  As to form, the earlier discussion 
has shown that there are many ways in which issues can be addressed internationally, 
ranging from business or industry arrangements to mixed business-government actions 
to regional agreements among governments to international codes, and to multilateral 
treaties negotiated in the appropriate fora.
70
  
 Who should identify the priority issues and suggest options as to how they could be 
addressed?  Obvious candidates to take the lead are think tanks or research institutions, 
a blue-ribbon commission or an international organization.  
  
When it comes to actual rule-making, the WTO may be a strong candidate. The 
WTO and, in particular, its predecessor, the GATT, have shown that substantial 
achievements are possible at the multilateral level. Moreover, the WTO has a broad 
remit, and it has already made some timid and tentative steps in the direction of 
dealing with micro-issues. Thus, the outcome of the Uruguay Round included a 
Ministerial Decision on Professional Services that provided: “As a matter of 
priority, the Working Party [on Professional Services] shall make 
recommendations for the elaboration of multilateral disciplines in the accountancy 
sector….”71 On conclusion of the negotiations on the accountancy disciplines in 
December 1998 (WTO, 1998), the WTO’s Services Council established a Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation, whose mandate included to “develop disciplines as 
appropriate for individual sectors or groups thereof.”72 Moreover, the WTO’s work 
in the area of telecommunications, through the formulation of its 
“Telecommunication Reference Paper,”73 is relevant here. This document, drafted 
on an informal basis by a group of like-minded WTO members and finalized in 
1997, contains a set of regulatory principles/standards for the regulation of 
telecommunication service providers. WTO members individually agreed upon it 
as containing binding commitments, and these were subsequently incorporated in 
the schedules of new accession countries as additional commitments. This may be 
one approach to move the micro-regulatory agenda forward. Indeed, this is the 
approach taken regarding some of the new issues that are being discussed in the 
new generation of services-trade agreements, for instance, on the governance of the 
internet (data flows, privacy, data confidentiality, etc.).   
 
UNCTAD could also be a candidate, especially if the idea is to pay special 
attention to the needs of developing countries. UNCTAD, too, has ventured – at 
least to a certain extent – into the area of micro-issues, for example, through its 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting, established in 1982.
74
 For, as observed earlier, 
developing countries and their firms (including state-owned enterprises) tend to be 
rule-takers and not rule-makers in the area of micro-regulation, and the interests of 
their firms thus need special attention. 
 
Finally, there are many specialized fora dealing with specific aspects of the 
international operations of firms, some of them mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
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Depending on their interests, they might be able to advance the discussion in 
specific fields. Special attention would need to be given to the ability of an 
organization to be able to react swiftly to changing circumstances, as there is the 
danger that, in a world of rapid innovations and changes, rules formulated by 
governments could be out of date by the time they are adopted.
75
 
 Regardless of who takes the lead, it is clear that the effort needs to involve all major 
stakeholders, particularly representatives from governments and businesses from 
developed and developing countries, but also from other parts of civil society, including 
trade unions, consumer organizations and other non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).
76
  The reason for government representatives is clear:  after all, a good part of the 
emerging global micro-regulatory frameworks will (eventually) consist of governmental 
arrangements; even more importantly, governments represent the public interest.  
Representatives of the business community are crucial because, after all, they are best 
placed to know what the key issues are and how they could be addressed. The involvement 
of all major stakeholders would also lead to a situation in which the process of creating 
micro-regulatory frameworks would not be either government-led and systematic, leading 
to mandatory instruments, or market-driven and ad hoc, leading to voluntary instruments, 
but rather result in a mixed approach that combines the interests and expertise of all major 
stakeholders. 
 But the question of the participation of businesses, trade unions, consumer 
organizations, and other NGOs is broader than the expertise and interests specific groups 
might represent and bring to the table.  Input by various stakeholders into international 
rule-making is a logical consequence of the globalization process and the strengthening of 
global institutions:  in the same manner in which businesses, trade unions, consumer 
organizations, and other NGOs seek to influence rule-making at the national level, they 
will more and more seek to influence rule-making at the international level as well; and, 
the more important these rules are, the more they will seek to do so.  If this cannot be done 
in a transparent institutional context, it will be done through the back door or in the streets.  
The only way to avoid increased interest by these groups in global rule-making is to 
reduce the relevance of such rule-making and of the institutions in which it takes place – 
which is precisely the opposite of what global markets and an integrated international 
production system need.  To be sure, this makes global rule-making even more 
complicated – but it also opens new opportunities for alliances, open or tacit ones.77 
 Still, greater participation by businesses, trade unions, consumer groups, and other 
NGOs is easier said than done, and it will require institutional innovations to increase 
transparency and establish appropriate mechanisms.  In any event, and independently of 
the mechanisms eventually established, nothing prevents whoever takes the lead in this 
matter from ensuring that all major stakeholders can provide their inputs on priority issues 
for the global agenda for micro-regulatory issues. 
In conclusion, the advanced state of macro-liberalization and rule-making for 
international economic transactions at the level of countries shifts the focus to a new 
frontier:  the need to establish micro-regulatory frameworks – and hence the regulatory 
infrastructure and rules of the road – for the various operations of firms in the globalizing 
world economy.  These rules would constitute the governance of the international 
operations of firms in the globalizing world economy.  The current ad-hoc and market-
driven process can be made more efficient, more likely to achieve a better balance between 
public and private interests, and ultimately more legitimate.  Such a process could involve, 
in the first instance, the systematic identification of issues requiring an international 
approach, as well as the identification of options for how to address them, in a process that 
involves all major stakeholders.  Such a process, ambitious as it would be, would amount 
 20 
to setting an agenda for the development of global micro-regulatory frameworks for 
various aspects of the international operations of firms in the globalizing world economy 
and, hence, its global governance as far as the operations of firms are concerned.  It would 
be the agenda for the next generation of global commercial rule-making. Pursuing such a 
process would involve going forward pragmatically, beginning with issues on which 
consensus might be easiest to achieve, in a piece-meal approach, focusing on subjects for 
which constituencies can be mobilized to advance the process, in whatever organizational 
framework is most appropriate.
78
   
 While the process that is being suggested here seeks to be a rational one, it is 
unavoidably also a profoundly political one, in at least two senses: it involves the old 
question of how best to balance the role of the state and the market; and it sets the stage for 
determining, in Harold D. Lasswell's (1936) classic definition of politics: "who gets what, 
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1
 This is exemplified by the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, in which regulatory harmonization is a key challenge. Behind-the-border 
issues are particularly important in the services sector where regulation often restricts 
market access. For a discussion, see Lim and Meester, 2014. 
2
 This list can easily be expanded, e.g., by adding such issues as data flows, privacy, data 
confidentiality, carbon emission trading, dumping of harmful waste, minimum product 
quality standards, liability issues, enforcement of all sorts of contracts, and money 
laundering. 
3
 See the G-20 “Communiqué”, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, February 22-23, 2014, para. 9, available at 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Communique%20Meeting%
20of%20G20%20Finance%20Ministers%20and%20Central%20Bank%20Governors%20S
ydney%2022-23%20February%202014_0.pdf, last visited April 8, 2015. 
4
 In some respects, the discussion here is akin to Lorraine Eden’s analysis of regulatory 
changes as a result of the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement: “A 
shift in the overall regulatory environment is occurring in North America, away from 
unilateral rules to bilateral and trilateral policy-making. This shift can be seen in two ways: 
as a move away from weak/soft international regulation (non-binding commitments at the 
regional level) towards strong/hard international regulation (binding, formal rules and 
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procedures); as a widening of the geographic scope of the regulatory environment from the 
national to the regional level.” See Eden, 1996, p. 62.  
5
 This article does not deal with products and processes, another important area in which 
global standards are increasingly becoming important. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) is a leader in setting international standards; as of early 2015, it had 
a portfolio of 19,500 standards (see, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm, last 
visited April 8, 2015). Even though ISO standards are voluntary, regulatory bodies have 
adopted a number of them, or they have become de facto standards. For a discussion, see, 
A. T. Kearney, 2012, and FIPRA, 2010.  
6
 Information provided by Michael Finger. Tariff reductions were agreed upon in rounds of 
trade negotiations. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), most-favored-nations tariff 
reductions of developed countries for industrial products (excluding petroleum) amounted 
to 38 percent; in the preceding Tokyo Round (1973-1979), they amounted to 33 percent. 
See WTO, 2007, p. 207. The WTO concluded: “Industrial countries have substantially 
reduced their tariffs since 1947. Only in a few categories can they still be considered a 
significant trade barrier” (ibid., p. 210). 
7
 To illustrate: between 1991 and 2001, some 95 percent of the policy changes in national 
regulatory regimes for FDI were in the direction of creating a more favorable environment 
for investment by MNEs (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 7) although that percentage had declined to 
70 percent by 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 106), the bulk of policy changes still goes in the 
direction of making the investment climate more favorable for international investors.  
The convergence toward similar (liberal) FDI regimes was aided by an explosion of 
bilateral investment treaties that strengthened the protection of foreign investment and 
facilitated access to markets; the number of bilateral investment treaties alone rose from 
385 at the end of the 1980s (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 1) to 2,902 at the end of 2013 (UNCTAD, 
2014, p. 114); to that, other international treaties covering international investment, 
numbering 334 by the end of the same year, need to be added. In fact, international 
investment agreements have become so widespread and strong, especially regarding the 
treatment of investors in the post-establishment phase of a project, that even a multilateral 
framework – if and when one should be negotiated – may do little more, at least initially, 
than lock in the autonomous and bilateral liberalization measures taken by many countries, 
which would increase predictability, stability and transparency. 
8
 See, e.g., the various editions of OECD, WTO and UNCTAD, “Reports on G20 Trade 
and Investment Measures” available on the websites of these institutions. 
9
 In principle, mode four of GATS covers labor mobility to a limited extent, as do various 
international investment agreements, but little has been achieved in practice. 
10
 For a listing of the largest 100 MNEs from developing and transition economies, ranked 
by foreign assets in 2012, see UNCTAD, 2014, Annex Table 29, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx, 
last visited April 8, 2015.  
11
 See the annual editions of the World Investment Report prepared by UNCTAD. 
12
 In fact, a portfolio of locational assets is now an important source of corporate 
competitiveness in all sectors (UNCTAD, 1995; Dunning, 1996, 2002). 
13
 The possibility of splitting up the production of services extends also to the various 
functions that are traditionally performed by corporate headquarters, ranging from 
communications to finance. They too can be located wherever it is best from the 




 The emergence of such complex networks makes it difficult at times to identify the 
boundaries of a particular firm or, for that matter, to determine its nationality and any 
liabilities in case of, for instance, gross negligence. 
15
 These developments also create challenges for international investment and trade 
statistics. These have always been difficult to interpret, given that countries do not 
necessarily follow the reporting guidelines provided by the IMF, UNCTAD and the 
OECD. More recently, moreover, the rise of special-purpose entities has become a major 
issue, as these entities serve primarily the purpose of managing the liquid assets of MNEs 
by channelling investment flows from one country to another; in other words, these flows 
do not reflect productive investment in the reporting host countries. Such entities can be 
located in any country. Moreover, firms from a number of countries (including Brazil, 
China and Russia) channel a substantial share of their FDI flows through tax havens or 
financial centres. Finally, round-tripping continues to present a statistical problem. 
Fortunately, UNCTAD and the OECD have begun to receive data from countries that host 
special-purpose entities (e.g., Luxembourg, Hungary and the Netherlands) and to correct 
the data accordingly, also for tax havens  (especially in the Caribbean). However, this 
correction does not yet cover all countries and distortions. They have therefore 
recommended that all countries report data with and without special-purpose-entity 
transactions. (For a discussion, see, OECD, 2015.) Note, however, that these corrections 
would lead to more accurate FDI statistics on the basis of the traditional balance-of-
payments approach to such statistics. These corrections would not capture, for example, 
FDI made on the basis of MNEs raising funds in the financial markets of host countries or 
in international financial markets outside their home countries. Moreover, these 
corrections would also not capture non-equity forms of control utilized by firms in regard 
to enterprises located abroad. Hence, FDI data substantially underestimate the share of 
production under the common governance of MNEs. 
16
 Traditionally, international rules are made by governments for other governments; in a 
sense, this process involves rules about rules.  International rules that apply directly to 
firms (while not unheard of) have not been the domain of traditional trade policy. Moving 
in that direction requires a paradigm change in international law.  
17
  This is not a new phenomenon. U.S. firms started to move abroad from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards; by 1914, practically all innovative and important firms had 
global operations, typically operating on a stand-alone basis. See Wilkins, 1970.   
18
 The focus of this chapter is on the activities of firms, regardless of industry, although 
some of the examples below are industry specific. The same argument can be made for 
labor-related, environmental, consumer, and other matters.  In fact, when it comes to the 
social dimension of globalization, it could be argued that, just as economic growth in many 
developed countries was facilitated by (and indeed may have required) a national social 
consensus, world economic growth would benefit from a world social consensus as well – 
precisely the idea underlying the Global Compact (Kell and Ruggie, 1999). 
19
 See, e.g., the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in which regulatory 
harmonization is one objective. See also the nascent efforts in the World Trade 
Organization discussed briefly below. 
20
 But see, e.g., Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000. The focus is here on corporate activity. 
There have, of course, been various (successful) efforts to establish global standards in 
such areas as defining time zones, the measurement of lengths and distances, etc. These 
types of arrangements are not considered here. 
21
 In a number of countries, furthermore, incoming M&As may be reviewed on the basis of 




 In 2001, GE abandoned its plan to acquire Honeywell. Although U.S. regulators had 
approved the deal, the European Commission objected and the deal did not take place.  
23
 Annex to UNCTAD, 2015, web Table 9.  
24
 Ibid., web Table 11. 
25
 “Perhaps the most effective model of international cooperation in merger control 
currently is the EU’s ‘one-stop shop,’ which allows parties to avoid multiple filings in the 
EU by submitting a single notification to the European Commission. Even this system, for 
all its merits, is far from flawless: many hundreds of transactions are still notified in more 
than one EU country each year.” See, Squire Sanders, 2012. 
26
 For example, U.S. law traditionally defers to foreign home jurisdictions in bankruptcy 
matters. As a consequence, U.S. victims of Polly Peck’s securities fraud could not seek 
recovery in the United States (Boshkoff, 1994, pp. 935-936).  
27
 UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, which seeks to encourage 
international cooperation, was adopted in 1997. See, UNCITRAL, available, at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html, last visited 
April 8, 2015.  
28
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “About the Basel Committee”, available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm, last visited April 8, 2015.  
29
 The Basel Committee consists of representatives from central banks and/or supervisory 
authorities from 27 jurisdictions: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus the 
European Central Bank See, Basel Committee, available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/, last 
visited April 8, 2015. 
30
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter, op. cit., section V (12). 
31
 BCBS, 2014, p. 8. It needs to be recognized, however, that compliance with Basel III 
(and, for that matter, Basel II) is not uniform, as “internationally active” is not a well-
defined term. The incorporation of Basel II and Basel III in national rules typically covers 
different sets of banks differently. Moreover, Basel II and Basel III do not consist of 
uniform sets of rules, but include options, typically for banks with different business 
models and at different levels of technical sophistication. 
32
 Caliskan and Cochran, 2003, pp. 1-3. 
33
 “The European Union addressed the issue of CRS well before ICAO. The Council of the 
European Communities issued, on 24 July 1989, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2299/89 
on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems. The regulation applies with the 
force of law to computerized reservation systems for air transport products, when offered 
for use and/or used in the territory of the Community, and their essence is to provide equal 
access and non-discrimination. A revised version of the Regulation is contained in 
Regulation (ERC) No. 323/1999 that entered into force on 15 March 1999” (Milde, 2008, 
p. 115). See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2299/89, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31989R2299, last visited April 8, 2015. 
34
 This absence of a multilateral solution is due in part to the strategic importance of 
national airlines in many countries, and to their double nature as both commercial service 
providers and public utilities (Abeyratne, 2005-2006, p. 50). 
35
 Regarding CRS regulation for example, the ICAO issued a Code of Conduct on the 
Regulation and Operation of Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) and developed a 
model CRS clause to be used in bilateral and multilateral agreements. See ICAO, available 
at http://www.icao.int/sustainability/pages/eap_ep_crs.aspx, last visited April 8, 2015 (“the 
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ICAO Council completed its review of the Code and adopted a revised version on 25 June 
1996 with model clauses to encourage its use. As of 1 September 1998, twenty-nine ICAO 
Member States either followed the ICAO Code or had CRS regulations which are 
consistent or compatible with it”). 
36
 Consolidated accounts are an aggregation of financial statements of individual 
companies constituting a group. These companies keep a single set of accounts. In a 
consolidation, the lines from the statements of the individual companies are put together, 
making adjustments for double-counting, etc., and then amending them to the extent that 
local principles are not in accordance with the international rules. Part of the appeal of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is that, when MNEs can use IFRS in 
the books of their foreign affiliates, there are no adjustments necessary during 
consolidation. 
37
 The Board has 14 members with accounting or finance background.  
38
 The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board has seven members with expertise in 
accounting, finance and business.  It is controlled by the Financial Accounting Foundation 
and advised by the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council with 34 members 
who are broadly representative of preparers, auditors and users of financial information.  
Members of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Advisory Council are nominated by the Board of Trustees made up of 16 
members representing constituent organizations having interest in financial reporting; see 
FASB, “Board Members,” available at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220131802, last visited April 
8, 2015; FAF, “FAF Trustees and Committees,” available at 
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/jsp/Foundation/Page/FAFLandingPage&cid=11761
64681018, last visited April 8, 2015.  
39
 IFRS Foundation, “Analysis of the IFRS Jurisdictional Profiles”, available at 
http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Pages/Analysis-of-the-IFRS-jurisdictional-
profiles.aspx, last visited April 8, 2015. It should be noted, however, that not all countries 
adopt all the standards, and not all public companies in these countries have to use these 
standards. On the other hand, this is not uncommon, even within countries; for example, 
the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are not applied uniformly across the 
United States. Both sets of standards allow for choices in some cases. 
40
There were 940 non-U.S. companies registered and reporting to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as of December 31, 2014; see, SEC, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml, last visited April 8, 2015. 
41
  The Economist, May 9, 2012. Though the International Financial Reporting Standards 
are largely based on the U.S. standards, the SEC does not allow U.S. companies to use 
only the international standards. The sector’s regulatory segmentation coincides with high 
access barriers to the profession in many countries. 
42
 The members of the Association account for 97% of the world's insurance premiums. 
See the Association’s website, available at http://www.iaisweb.org, last visited April 8, 
2015. 
43
 As far as trade in food products is concerned, the Codex Alimentarius seeks “to ensure 
safe, good food for everyone, everywhere” through international food standards, 
guidelines and codes of practice; see, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/codex-home/en/, 
last visited April 8, 2015. 
44
 For example, a French court failed to prohibit Delaware-based Yahoo! from selling Nazi 
memorabilia to French consumers online. A U.S. District Court in California issued a 
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declaratory judgment that ruled that the French order could not be enforced in the United 
States (Stewart and Matthews, 2002, pp. 1116-1118). 
45
 In particular, U.S. authorities have disagreed with the European Union’s approach that 
enables consumers to sue in their country of habitual residence (Stewart and Matthews, 
2002, pp. 1119-20). 
46
 On July 1, 2014, the French bank BNP Paribas (BNPP) pleaded guilty to processing 
billions of dollars of transactions through the U.S. financial system on behalf of sanctioned 
entities. BNP hence acknowledged that it processed disguised transactions for Cuban, 
Iranian and Sudanese entities in violation of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act (Zagaris, 2014). 
47
 In 2007, for example, Cuban officials were denied a room in a Norwegian hotel of the 
United States-based Hilton hotel chain. Hilton did not want to take the chance of violating 
the Trading with the Enemy Act. On the other hand, the Norwegian hotel faced a legal 
complaint in Norway for discriminating on the basis of citizenship. Similarly, in 1997, a 
Canadian subsidiary of Wal-Mart stopped selling Cuban pajamas when faced with 
potential sanctions under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act. Canadian authorities, 
however, ordered the product back on its shelves in the name of the country’s Foreign 
Extraterritorial Measures Act, a national law barring enforcement of non-Canadian trade 
laws incompatible with Canada’s trade interests (Rathbone et al., 2013, pp. 1072, 1120-
1122). 
48
 Of course, this is an extremely sensitive issue, as also reflected in the leeway provided 
under GATT Art. XXI and GATS Art. XIVbis. 
49
 The rules apply to domestic or foreign airline-affiliated computer reservation systems 
“used by travel agencies in the U.S.” (Leaming, 1993, p.  495).  
50
 UNCITRAL, “Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, Status”, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html, last 
visited April 8, 2015. 
51
 See, 11 U.S.C. § 1501. See also United States Courts, “Chapter 15: Ancillary and Other 
Cross-Border Cases”, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter15.aspx, 
last visited April 8, 2015.  
52
 See, IFRS Foundation, “About Us,” available at http://www.ifrs.org/About-
us/Pages/Monitoring-Board.aspx, last visited April 8, 2015. “Through the Monitoring 
Board, securities regulators that allow or require the use of IFRS in their jurisdictions will 
be able to more effectively carry out their mandates regarding investor protection, market 
integrity, and capital formation.” See, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/Monitoring-
Board.aspx”, last visited April 10, 2015. 
53
 See, http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=getPage&nodeId=25181, last visited April 8, 
2015. 
54
 ILO, “Mission and Objectives”, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/lang--en/index.htm, last visited April 8, 2015. Note, however, that ILO conventions 
commit only the countries that have actually ratified them, but they cannot be enforced. 
55
 Komori and Wellens, 2013. Partly this is the case because the Committee’s agenda deals 
primarily with longstanding problems that have become apparent in the Committee’s more 
developed members or that have arisen in the context of the recent financial crisis (which 
involved primarily developed countries). 
56
 In some of these instances, rule-making may take place through a “club approach”, as 
developed by Eden and Hampson for the cooperation of states to capture benefits of 
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cooperation, whereby clubs “should be viewed as dynamic institutions whose membership 
may well change over time”. See Eden and Hampson, 1997, p. 380.  
57
 OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationoninternationalinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm, last 
visited April 8, 2015. As of early 2015, all 34 OECD member countries and 12 non-OECD 
members had adhered to the Guidelines. 
58
 See, e.g., ILO, 1977; and UNCTAD, 1980; see United Nations document 
TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981). 
59
 See, the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” 2011.   
60
 To the extent that these frameworks are beginning to be formulated in the context of 
bilateral or regional trade agreements, it may well be that a few dominant players 
effectively pre-empt any future multilateral initiatives. 
61
 See, e.g., the response of the G20 to the question of tax avoidance by MNEs, G20, 2014, 
p.2.  
62
 In terms of the absolute value of their assets abroad. 
63
 UNCTAD, 2014, p. 32. In 2013, 57 percent of employment of the top 100 was located 
abroad. 
64
 Basically all non-OECD countries. 
65
 In reaction to a series of scandals, the United States adopted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977. As this Act was seen to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
firms headquartered in other countries when engaging in business abroad, the country’s 
government sought to multilateralize its approach to illicit payments. Accordingly, it 
succeeded in launching negotiations in the United Nations on an international agreement 
on illicit payments. However, when the Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments 
(available at 
unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/iia/docs/compendium/en/9%20volume%201.pdf, last 
visited April 8, 2015) was put before the General Assembly in 1979, that body took no 
action since neither the developing countries, nor other developed countries were 
supportive of such an instrument. However, the issue was later addressed in the OECD and 
led to the adoption of the “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions,” which entered into force on February 15, 1999 
(available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf, last 
visited April 8, 2015). The issue returned to the United Nations, where the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption was eventually adopted by the General Assembly on 
October 31, 2003; it entered into force on December 14, 2005 (available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf, last visited April 8, 2015).  
66
 One difference might be that, when the trade regime was created, there was broad 
agreement on the principles governing trade, an agreement that is still largely absent 
regarding the micro-regulatory issues discussed here. At the same time, though, the need to 
close the governance gap is recognized from time to time, e.g., when governments took 
action on corruption and tax avoidance. 
67
 There is of course the challenge that many countries – but by far not all – have limited 
capacity to participate in such rule-making processes. And there are of course other 
challenges. For example, who would decide on who is entitled to represent legitimate 
(social, environmental, commercial, prudential, etc.) interests? Would these interests first 
be balanced in a national context or could they be pursued immediately at the international 
level? How could the more economically powerful states/unions/business 
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associations/non-governmental organizations be prevented from setting the agenda? What 
would be the appropriate forum? 
68
 There are some indications that a more systematic approach is already being adopted, 
especially in the social and environmental areas.  Social and environmental issues have 
moved far in terms of a systematic process, partly because of support from strong 
constituencies (labor unions and environmental groups), partly because of their inherently 
global nature and partly because the need for a systematic process was recognized.  
69
 Although the focus of this article has been on business issues, such an exercise could 
also include related matters, such as environmental and social issues, as these are closely 
linked to, if not an inextricable part of, the economic globalization process. 
70
 It needs to be recognized that the negotiation of global micro-rules would place a great 
burden on developing countries, many of which are still seeking to implement the 
agreements negotiated in the context of macro-liberalization.  But the alternative – to leave 
the determination of such rules to others – carries the risk that the interests of the 
developing countries (or, more precisely, of their firms) would be ignored; this, in turn, 
would eventually raise legitimacy concerns. 
71
 Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (April 1994), 
“Decision on Professional Services,” para. 2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/51-dsprf_e.htm (last visited January 12, 2015). 
The job description of one of the 18 new posts that were created at that time referred to 
expertise in accounting – a far cry from what most people think the WTO is all about, but 
perhaps indicative of what that organization may increasingly be about in the years to 
come.   
72
 WTO, 1999, para. 3. It should be noted, however, that the WTO domestic regulation 
negotiations do not seek to define the micro-regulatory framework for the globalizing 
world economy but rather aim at curbing protectionist and anti-competitive behavior, by 
establishing rules to ensure that regulations do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade 
in services. In other words, the rules sought by the WTO are not prescriptive for the 
content of regulations nor do they seek to harmonize regulations or set standards, leaving 
that to regulators/governments. (See, Lim and De Meester, op. cit.)  
73
 The Telecommunication Reference Paper was never formally adopted. But many of the 
WTO’s new members, as well as those that negotiated it initially, incorporated it into their 
commitments. See, e.g., WTO, 2013.  
74
 See, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISAR/ISAR-Corporate-Transparency-
Accounting.aspx, last visited December 17, 2014. For a review of the work of this 
Working Group, see Ruffing, 2015.  
75
 See, for example, the situation concerning commercial drones where innovation appears 
to be far ahead of even national rules governing their utilization. 
76
 Reference was made earlier to the Codex Alimentarius. By way of example, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission had, as of March 2015, 186 members and 229 observers, 
including a number of business organizations, consumer groups and other NGOs; 
furthermore, the Codex meetings are public. See, 
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/members-observers/en/, last visited April 3, 2015. 
77
 An example of a tacit alliance between a number of governments and NGOs was the 
effort on access to medicines that led to the adoption, during the 2001 Doha WTO 
ministerial meeting, of a resolution concerning the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. 
78
 In some ways, such a process is reminiscent of the approach taken to advance European 
integration; see Haas, 1964. 
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